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Debates about national security and the global economy are merging into a single debate about relative national power.

有关国家安全与全球经济的辩论,正逐渐融合为一场有关国家相对实力的辩论。

FOR DECADES, the study of international security has been divorced from the study of international trade and investment, along with domestic economic development. In political science departments on university campuses, self-described realists debate defense and diplomacy with idealists of various kinds. In the economics department next door, there is no debate; the academic economists almost unanimously agree that free trade and investment benefit all sides. They instead postulate an ideal world where national borders would be insignificant and there would be free flows of goods, services, money and labor.

几十年来,随着国内经济的发展,对国际安全的研究与对国际贸易和投资的研究相脱节。
在大学校园的政治科学系,自称现实主义者的人与各种各样的理想主义者辩论国防和外交,而在隔壁的经济系,却没有争论。
学院派的经济学家几乎一致认为,自由贸易和投资对各方都有利。
取而代之的是,他们假设了一个理想的世界,在这个世界里,国家边界是无关紧要的,商品、服务、货币和劳动力将自由流动。



Many of the same factories that produce capital goods or civilian consumer goods can be converted to produce weapons. It is thus not enough for rival powers to monitor each other’s standing armies, navies, fleets and stocks of weaponry; they must also monitor the overall industrial capacity of their actual or potential rivals. Industrial capacity, in turn, has to be defined broadly to include the entire economy of the rival state—not only its factories, but also its infrastructure, energy and telecommunications systems, resources, workforce and financial system. In the mass mobilization wars of the industrial age, like the two world wars, whole economies have gone to war with each other. Even in the less-intense Cold War economies were partly mobilized.

许多生产资本货物或民用消费品的工厂可以转变为生产武器。
因此,对立的大国仅仅监控彼此的常备陆军、海军、舰队和武器储备是不够的,它们还必须监控其实际或潜在对手的整体工业产能。
反过来,必须对工业产能进行广义界定,以包括这个竞争对手国家的整个经济——不仅包括工厂,还包括基础设施、能源和电信系统、资源、劳动力和金融体系。
在工业时代的大规模动员战争中,比如两次世界大战,整个经济体都陷入了战争,即使在不那么激烈的冷战时期,经济也被部分动员起来。

There can be no simple dividing line between civilian and military production. The space race between the United States and the Soviet unx—prompted by the latter’s launching of the Sputnik satellite—always had military implications.

民用生产和军用生产之间没有简单的分界线,美国和苏联之间的太空竞赛——由苏联发射人造卫星“斯普特尼克”( Sputnik ) 引发——总是具有军事意义。

Any country which hopes to be an independent great power must be able to obtain and maintain its own state-of-the-art manufacturing sector, if only for fear of falling behind in the economic arms race inspired by the security dilemma. As Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. Treasury Secretary, wrote in his Report on Manufactures, the United States must be “independent on foreign nations for military and other essential supplies.” Overall, Hamilton, who viewed with scorn the Jeffersonian vision of America as an agrarian paradise, sought to protect America’s nascent industry from the depredations of the more developed European nation-states.

任何希望成为一个独立大国的国家都必须能够获得并保持其最先进的制造部门,哪怕只是因为担心在安全困境引发的经济军备竞赛中落后。
正如美国第一任财政部长亚历山大 · 汉密尔顿在他的《制造业报告》中写道,美国必须“在军事和其他必需品供应方面独立于其他国家” 。
总的来说,汉密尔顿蔑视杰斐逊视美国为农业天堂的观点,试图保护美国的新兴产业免受更发达的欧洲民族国家的掠夺。



What is true of firms is also true of the nations in which the firms are based. In theory, a single country or trade bloc can monopolize all of the manufacturing in a particular industry. China could make all of the world’s iPhones, Europe’s Airbus could make all jetliners, Japan could make all automobiles and South Korea could make all ships. Once achieved, these national or bloc monopolies in particular industrial sectors characterized by increasing returns could be long-lasting. Their very success ensures high barriers to entry, protecting incumbents from would-be competitors. Indonesia would have a hard time breaking into a global jetliner market monopolized by Airbus.

公司的情况也适用于公司所在的国家。
理论上,一个国家或贸易集团可以垄断某一特定行业的全部制造业。
中国可以制造世界上所有的 iphone,欧洲的空中客车可以制造所有的喷气式客机,日本可以制造所有的汽车,韩国可以制造所有的船只。
一旦实现,这些国家或集团在特定工业部门的垄断拥有属性将会持续很长时间。
他们的成功确保了很高的进入壁垒,保护现有企业免受潜在竞争者的攻击,比如印度尼西亚将很难打入空中客车垄断的全球客机市场。

Conventional academic economists might see nothing wrong with such a world. Traditional trade theory is based on the idea that countries should specialize along the lines of absolute advantage (Adam Smith) or comparative advantage (David Ricardo).

传统的学院派经济学家可能并不认为这样的世界有什么不妥。
传统的贸易理论是基于这样的观点,即国家应该沿着绝对优势( 亚当·斯密 ) 或比较优势( 大卫·李嘉图) 的路线进行专业化。

BUT GUIDED by the logic of the military-economic security dilemma, prudent national strategists will ignore the academic free traders and their libertarian allies. From the point of view of national security, industrial interdependence is not a courageous step toward the utopian ideal of a borderless global market and a golden age of perpetual peace. Far from that, it is a dangerous risk that must be minimized. In particular, national strategists must ensure that the supply chains in the country’s defense industrial base are not located in the territory of potential military rivals or in coercible third countries. They must protect the militarily-relevant industries they have and, if necessary, obtain new ones. This is the essence of the approach that the economist Robert D. Atkinson and I have described as “national developmentalism.”

但是,在军事-经济“ 安全困境”的逻辑指引下,谨慎的国家战略家将忽略学术上的自由贸易者及其自由主义同盟。
从国家安全的角度来看,工业相互依存并不是迈向无国界的全球市场和永久和平的黄金时代这一乌托邦理想的勇敢一步——远非如此,而且是一种必须最小化的危险风险。
特别是,国家战略家必须确保该国国防工业基地的供应链不位于潜在军事对手的领土或可强制的第三国,它们必须保护它们所拥有的与军事有关的产业,必要时还要获得新的产业。
这就是经济学家罗伯特·阿特金森 ( Robert D.Atkinson) 和我所描述的“国家发展主义”的本质。

As we have seen, the very scale and success of existing manufacturing sectors pose barriers to entry into a sector on the part of not only new firms, but also of entire nations. This being the case, late-developed countries which seek to acquire industries that are already flourishing elsewhere can do so only by means of market-defying policies.

正如我们所看到的,现有制造业部门的规模和成功不仅对新公司,而且对整个国家都构成了进入该部门的障碍。
在这种情况下,那些寻求收购那些在其他地方已经蓬勃发展的产业的后发国家只能通过无视市场的政策来做到这一点。

In the early industrial era, Britain had a near-monopoly over global manufacturing. Acting to promote British interests, economists like Smith and Ricardo tried to persuade other countries not to compete with British manufacturing, but to specialize in supplying raw materials to British factories and cheap food to British factory workers. For example, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith wrote:

在早期工业时代,英国几乎垄断了全球制造业。
为了促进英国的利益,史密斯和李嘉图等经济学家试图说服其他国家不要与英国的制造业竞争,而是专门向英国工厂提供原材料,向英国工厂工人提供廉价食品。
例如,在《国富论》(1776)中,亚当 · 斯密写道:



The truth is that every country that has successfully caught up with earlier industrialized nations has protected its infant industries by one method or another. Consider Asia. Following World War II, as part of their programs to catch up with the West in industrial capacity, Japan and the “Little Tigers”—South Korea and Taiwan—used nontariff means such as regulations, currency manipulation and other tactics to protect their domestic firms from imports while subsidizing their own exports. More recently, China has followed in these footsteps by “cheating” in order to build up its manufacturing. Beijing has promoted a variety of policies—including luring Western firms with cheap labor, protecting its internal markets, stealing foreign intellectual property and subsidizing its exports by means of currency manipulation—to bolster its economic prowess. Only now has Washington begun to respond to this systematic exploitation of American industry.

事实上,每一个成功赶上早期工业化国家的国家都用这样或那样的方法保护了它的新兴工业。
以亚洲为例,第二次世界大战之后,日本和“小虎”——韩国和台湾——为了在工业产能方面赶上西方,采取了一些措施,比如制定规章、操纵汇率等非关税手段,以保护本国企业不受进口影响,同时补贴本国出口。
最近,中国为了发展制造业,也在追随这些脚步以“作弊”。
北京推行了各种政策,包括用廉价劳动力吸引西方企业、保护国内市场、窃取外国知识产权,以及通过操纵汇率补贴出口,以提升中国的经济实力。
直到现在,华盛顿才开始对美国工业的这种系统性剥削作出反应。

Such developments raise an obvious question—if considerations of national security and industrial self-sufficiency are so important, then why has free trade ever existed at all? The answer is that free trade is something of a historical aberration; it has been extremely uncommon in the two and a half centuries since the industrial era began. The world economy between the early modern era and the 1940s was carved up among protectionist European empires and protectionist nation-states like the United States. There was a brief period of trade liberalization in the mid-nineteenth century, promoted by Britain and France, but that was rejected by late-developing nations like the United States and Germany.

这种发展提出了一个明显的问题:
如果国家安全和工业自给自足的考虑如此重要,那么自由贸易究竟为什么会存在呢?
答案是,自由贸易在某种程度上是一种历史偏差。
自工业时代开始以来的两个半世纪里,自由贸易极其罕见。
从现代早期到20世纪40年代,世界经济被欧洲的保护主义帝国和像美国这样的保护主义民族国家瓜分。
19世纪中叶,在英国和法国的推动下,曾有过一段短暂的贸易自由化时期,但遭到了美国和德国等后发展国家的拒绝。

As economic realism would predict, free trade is promoted very rarely, and only then by great powers which do not fear military or industrial competition. Put otherwise, countries are apt to promote free trade, not in the abstract, but in proportion to the amount that it is likely to benefit them directly. Exhibit A is Great Britain: after having employed protectionist measures for centuries to build up and expand its manufacturing lead, Britain opportunistically became an evangelist for free trade in the mid-nineteenth century, hoping to open up fresh foreign markets for its exports. A century later, after 1945, the United States also switched from infant-industry protectionism and preached free trade with the zeal of a convert.

正如经济现实主义所预测的那样,自由贸易很少得到促进,只有在这种情况下,才会得到那些不惧怕军事或工业竞争的大国的推动。
换句话说,各国倾向于促进自由贸易,不是因为抽象的原因,而是因为与自由贸易可能直接给它们带来的利益成正比。
例证之一是因果:
在采取了几个世纪的保护主义措施来建立和扩大其制造业的领先地位之后,英国在19世纪中叶成为了自由贸易的传道者,希望为其出口开辟新的外国市场。
一个世纪之后,也就是1945年之后,美国也从幼稚的工业保护主义转向以皈依者的热情鼓吹自由贸易。



Neither Britain nor the United States following their heydays have acted on this common-sense logic. Britain should have abandoned its policy of unilateral free trade in the 1870s and 1880s in response to the rise of protectionist America and Germany. Instead, it did not adopt neo-protectionism until the 1930s. By then, a crepuscular glow had set on the British empire—its elites realizing all too late that their might was disappearing.

全盛期之后,英国和美国都没有按照这种常识逻辑行事。
19世纪70年代和80年代,英国应该放弃单边自由贸易政策,以应对美国和德国保护主义的崛起。
相反,它直到上世纪30年代才采取新保护主义,那时,大英帝国已经笼罩在暮光之中——其精英阶层意识到他们的实力正在消失,但为时已晚。

Likewise, the United States dallied when it should have abandoned liberal hegemony for a more transactional Nixonian economic nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s, once American manufacturing began to be battered by revived German and East Asian imports, even before the industrial rise of China. Instead, for the last half-century, the United States, like Britain a century earlier, has done the reverse. Mesmerized by a putative liberal world order, Washington has extended its military frontier, taking on more and more imperial commitments, while allowing mercantilist Asian and European trading partners to wipe out much of American manufacturing. Likewise, U.S.-based multinationals have transferred over much of their production capacity to China, Mexico and other countries, where cheaper labor or government subsidies exist in abundance.

同样,上世纪70年代和80年代,美国制造业开始受到德国和东亚出口商品复苏的冲击,甚至在中国工业崛起之前,它就应该放弃自由霸权,转而奉行更具交易性的尼克松经济民族主义,但美国却没有这样做。
在过去的半个世纪里,美国和一个世纪前的英国一样,采取了相反的做法。
被假定的自由主义世界秩序所迷惑,华盛顿扩大了军事边疆,承担了越来越多的帝国承诺,同时允许重商主义的亚洲和欧洲贸易伙伴摧毁美国的大部分制造业。
同样,美国的跨国公司已经将大部分生产能力转移到中国、墨西哥和其他劳动力成本较低或政府补贴充足的国家。

In my view, the persistence of free trade policies in Britain and the United States, even after they became harmful, is perhaps best explained in terms of domestic political factors. The most important among these is the political influence of finance.


在我看来,英国和美国持续的自由贸易政策,也许最好用国内政治因素来解释(即使在它们变得有害之后), 其中最重要的是金融的政治影响力。

Nations that rise to dominance via manufacturing enjoy vast profits, which are ploughed back into finance in the same country. Initially, a country’s financial sector tends to grow on the back of manufacturing and other industries. Consider how the Rockefellers moved from manufacturing into banking, or how Texas oil profits seeded Houston and Dallas banks.

通过制造业获得主导地位的国家享有巨额利润,这些利润被再投入同一个国家的金融业。
最初,一个国家的金融部门往往依靠制造业和其他行业发展壮大。
想想洛克菲勒家族是如何从制造业转向银行业的,或者德克萨斯州的石油利润是如何催生了休斯顿和达拉斯的银行。

The problem is that a politically dominant financial sector may be willing to sacrifice the interest of domestic manufacturers in the service of other goals, like opening trading partners to financial investment. More than a century ago, in the debate over British policy, the City of London successfully defeated the British economic nationalists whose fears about German military and economic power and the decline of British industry were brutally confirmed in the world wars.

问题在于,一个政治上占主导地位的金融业会宁愿牺牲国内制造商的利益来实现其他目标,比如向金融投资开放贸易伙伴。
一个多世纪以前,在关于英国政策的辩论中,伦敦金融城( City Of London )成功地击败了英国的经济民族主义者,后者对德国军事和经济实力以及英国工业衰落的担忧,在两次世界大战中得到了残酷的证实。



In the long run, the restoration of liberal globalism on a smaller scale minus China is unlikely to succeed. For one thing, America’s European and Asian allies cannot agree whether China is a threat or a commercial opportunity. For another, India, should it rise to great power status, is no more likely than China to give up self-interested economic nationalism and convert to quaint nineteenth-century British free-trade ideology of the obscurantist kind recycled in mathematical form in American economics departments.

从长远来看,在没有中国的情况下,在较小规模上恢复自由的全球主义是不太可能成功的。
首先,美国的欧洲和亚洲盟友无法就中国是一个威胁还是一个商业机会达成一致。
另一方面,如果印度崛起为大国,它放弃自私自利的经济民族主义、转向19世纪古怪的英国自由贸易思想的可能性与中国一样,这种思想以数学形式在美国经济学系中反复出现。

Thanks to the logic of the security dilemma, in a multipolar world of rival great powers in which the major centers of military-industrial power are North America, Europe, East Asia and South Asia, in the decades ahead international liberalization as a general economic strategy is unlikely to find powerful champions. To be sure, there may be a high degree of economic integration among allied countries, as well as free trade in particular industries of lesser strategic significance. But the major powers will not allow market forces to compel them to lose not only narrowly-defined military industries, but also a much larger set of strategic industries with both military and civilian applications.

由于“ 安全困境”的逻辑,在一个敌对大国多极化的世界中,军工强国的主要中心是北美、欧洲、东亚和南亚,在未来几十年,作为一般经济战略的国际自由化不太可能找到强有力的支持者。
可以肯定的是,盟国之间可能有高度的经济一体化,以及战略意义较小的特定行业的自由贸易。
但主要大国不会允许市场力量迫使它们失去的不仅是定义狭隘的军事行业,还有规模大得多的战略行业,既有军事用途,也有民用用途。
但主要大国不会让市场力量迫使它们不仅失去狭义的军事产业,而且还失去一系列规模大得多的,既有军事用途,也有民用用途的战略产业。

Power politics is back. The dream of a global free market is dead.

强权政治卷土重来,全球自由市场的梦想已经破灭。

Michael Lind is a Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and co-author, with Robert D. Atkinson, of Big is Beautiful: Debunking the Myth of Small Business.

作者介绍:
迈克尔 · 林德是林登 · B · 约翰逊公共事务学院的教授,与罗伯特·D·阿特金森合著有《大即是美: 揭穿小企业的神话》( Big Is Beautiful:Disunking the Myth)一书。